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The Enforceability of Patent Settlement
Agreements After Lear, Inc. v. Adkins
In many areas of the legal system, parties are encouraged to
settle their disputes without resorting to full-dress litigation.1 Such
compromises conserve judicial resources and provide faster,
cheaper, and therefore more effective relief.2 To facilitate compro-
mise, courts ordinarily treat settlement agreements as binding and
enforceable contracts.3 In patent disputes, however, the effect of
settlement agreements is problematical. Lower federal courts,
faced with three Supreme Court decisions4 that are relevant but
not dispositive, have created a conflicting body of law, under which
settlement agreements are sometimes not enforced at all,5 some-
times enforced in part,6 and sometimes given almost full effect.7
This comment does not seek to resolve or to reconcile the large
patent and antitrust issues of which patent settlements are only a
part. The Supreme Court's decisions in this area have been the
subject of extensive academic interpretation and criticism.8 In-
1 E.g., claims to land, Hennessy v. Bacon, 137 U.S. 78 (1890); disputes involving con-
struction contracts, D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Loflin, 440 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 851 (1971); personal injury claims, Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
and contracts for the sale of goods, J. Kahn & Co. v. Clark, 178 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1949).
2 Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
" That is, questions of the existence of a contract, the meaning of its terms, and special
defenses of fraud, duress, or mutual mistake can be raised. Absent these questions, "an
agreement of the parties settling a disputed liability is as conclusive of their rights as a
judgment would be if it had been litigated instead of compromised." J. Kahn & Co. v. Clark,
178 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1949); accord, Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1201 n.17
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Crisp County v. S.J. Groves & Sons, Co., 73 F.2d 327, 329 (5th Cir. 1934).
See generally 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1268, at 72-73 (rev. ed. 1962); id. § 1292,
at 178-80.
" Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories
v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653
(1969). See Part I infra.
5 See text and notes at notes 45-48 infra.
' See text and notes at notes 53-63 infra.
7 See text and notes at notes 68-78 infra.
8 A sampling of the articles that discuss Lear, Inc. v. Adkins includes: Arnold & Gold-
stein, Life Under Lear, 48 TEx. L. R-v. 1235 (1970); Dodds, After Lear v. Adkins-What?,
51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 621 (1969); Jennings & Bryan, The Ever Expansive Scope of Lear v.
Adkins: Does It Have Limits?, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 679 (1977); McCarthy, "Unmuzzling"
the Patent Licensee: Chaos in the Wake of Lear v. Adkins, 45 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 429
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stead, the comment argues that patent settlement agreements
should be enforced, by their terms, because per se enforceability is
the simplest and most practical way of alleviating the current con-
fusion-confusion that benefits neither patentees, licensees, nor
the general public.
I. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A patent is "a grant.., for the term of seventeen years, ....
of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling [an]
invention throughout the United States."9 To ensure that the pat-
ent system serves its constitutionally mandated 0 purpose of stimu-
lating and protecting true invention, and does not provide monop-
oly returns for ideas that were already part of the public domain or
for inconsequential improvements of them, a patentable idea must
meet specific criteria of usefulness, novelty, and nonobviousness.11
The value of a patent lies in the patentee's ability to enforce
his chosen method of exploiting his invention by bringing infringe-
ment suits against anyone who makes, uses, or sells it without his
consent.12 The defenses available to an alleged infringer are nonin-
fringement, patent invalidity, and patent misuse. s The infringer
can also take the offensive by bringing a declaratory judgment ac-
tion " or an antitrust suit.15 In all litigation, the patent is accorded
(1977); Stern, Antitrust Implications of Lear v. Adkins, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 213 (1970). On
Blonder-Tongue, see, e.g., Halpern, Blonder-Tongue: A Discussion and Analysis (pts. 1-2),
53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 761 (1971), 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 5 (1972); Kahn, Blonder-Tongue and
the Shape of Future Patent Litigation, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 581 (1971). Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), is discussed in, e.g., Goldstein, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.: Notes on a Closing Circle, 1974 Sup. CT. Rlv. 81; Stern, A Reexamination of Pre-
emption of State Trade Secret Law After Kewanee, 42 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 927 (1974). On
Aronson, see, e.g., Altman, A Quick Point Regarding Perpetual Trade Secret Royalty Lia-
bility, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 510 (1979).
9 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
n 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1976).
12 Id. §§ 271, 281.
13 Noninfringement and invalidity are statutory defenses. Id. § 282(2). Patent misuse is
a judicially created defense, analogous to the equitable doctrine of unclean hands. Courts
have long held that any attempt by a patentee to expand the scope or duration of the lim-
ited monopoly constitutes misuse and renders the patent unenforceable, at least for the
duration of the misuse. See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488(1942).14 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1976).
15 See generally Kennedy, Patent and Antitrust Policy: The Search for a Unitary
Theory, 35 GEo. WAsH. L. RFv. 512 (1967) (discussion of when and what kinds of patent
48:715
Enforceability of Patent Settlements
a presumption of validity, and the burden of proving invalidity
rests on the party asserting it. 6
Three Supreme Court decisions have shaped the treatment of
patent settlement agreements within the confines of the statutory
scheme just described. None has dealt directly with patent
settlements.
A. Lear and Licensee Estoppel
For over a century,17 the doctrine of licensee estoppel gener-
ally prevented a patent licensee from challenging the validity of a
patent,18 even if the license terms did not bar challenges, on the
ground that he "should not be permitted to enjoy the benefit af-
forded by the agreement while simultaneously urging that the pat-
ent which forms the basis of the agreement is void."19 In Lear, Inc.
v. Adkins,20 the Supreme Court reconsidered the doctrine of licen-
see estoppel in light of its recent opinions stressing the public in-
terest in free competition,21 and abandoned it. 22 The Court also set
aside a license term that would have required the licensee to pay
royalties until the patent was finally declared invalid.2 It did not
decide, however, whether state contract law or federal patent law
would govern with regard to royalties paid before the patent was
misuse amounts to antitrust violation).
16 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976).
1 See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950);
Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1856). Justice Harlan's treatment of the state
of the law before Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663-68 (1969), is somewhat revisionist.
18 A challenge could be made where there was patent misuse or where the license agree-
ment was contrary to public policy. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950).
19 Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 891, 435 P.2d 321, 325-26, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545, 550
(1967), vacated, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
20 395 U.S. 653 (1969). While he was a Lear employee, Adkins applied for a patent on
his improvements of gyroscope technology. He then negotiated an agreement with Lear that
Lear would pay royalties for the use of Adkins's invention. The agreement gave Lear the
right to terminate if no patent issued or if a patent was granted but subsequently held
invalid. For several years Lear paid royalties; after 1957 it became convinced that no patent
would ever issue and ceased making all but a small number of payments. In 1960 Adkins
obtained his patent, and brought suit for the unpaid royalties and for royalties for the entire
patent term, arguing that Lear's contractual agreement estopped it to challenge the validity
of Adkins's patent.
21 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
12 395 U.S. at 668, 671. On this point the Court was unanimous.
'3 Id. at 671-74 (although Justice White, concurring in part, argued that this issue was
not properly before the Court, id. at 682 & n.2).
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granted.24 One of the Court's major premises was that "[l]icensees
may often be the only individuals with enough economic incentive
to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they are
muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to
would-be monopolists without need or justification. '25
B. Aronson and the Reach of Lear
In Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,26 the designer of a key
ring had contracted with a manufacturer to produce it. The con-
tract called for one level of royalty payments while the patent ap-
plication was pending and a lower level if the application was de-
nied. Dealing only with the second part of the contract,27 the Court
enforced its terms. "[N]either the holding nor the rationale of Lear
controls when no patent has issued, and no ideas have been with-
drawn from public use." 28 The Court also reiterated its holding in
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.2 9 that federal patent law did not
oust state trade secret law, even where the secret was an inherently
patentable idea for which no patent protection was sought.8 The
Court thus limited the reach of Lear: it does not affect the availa-
bility of trade secret protection, and it does not apply to contrac-
tual arrangements where no patent ultimately issues. The precise
question left open in Lear-namely, the enforceability of contracts
made during the pendency of a patent application-remains
unanswered.$1
C. Blonder-Tongue and Incentives to Litigate
The third decision in the trilogy, Blonder-Tongue Laborato-
ries v. University of Illinois Foundation,2 wrought a fundamental
2" Id. at 674-75 (with Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Doug-
las, dissenting on this point, id. at 676-77).
" Id. at 670.
26 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
2 Quick Point Pencil had paid royalties at the higher rate for 5 years, and at the lower
rate for 14. Thereafter it sought a declaratory judgment that the contract was unenforce-
able. Id. at 259-60.
28 Id. at 264.
29 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
30 Id. at 489-91; see Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262, 265-66
(1979).
21 Because Quick Point Pencil's challenge dealt only with the later aspect of the con-
tract, "[t]his case does not require us to draw the line between what constitutes abuse of a
pending application and what does not." 440 U.S. at 265.
2 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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change in the patentee's ability to protect his patent by litigation.
Concerned with the expense of patent litigation and the concomi-
tant drain on judicial resources, 83 the Supreme Court abandoned
the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel." Thus a single judgment of
patent invalidity would be conclusive against the patentee, but a
judgment of patent validity would not insulate him from further
challenges.
D. Summary
Together, these three decisions focus attention on patent set-
tlements. Under the Aronson-Kewanee line, the inventor who is
willing to settle for trade secret protection, and the would-be
patentholder whose application is denied, are both remitted to
state law. But relations between the successful patent applicant
and his licensee are subject to Lear and Blonder-Tongue. The pat-
entee, if he cannot forestall initial challenges under Lear and is
forced to litigate repeatedly under Blonder-Tongue, will seek some
alternate method of resolving disputes. The licensee, on the other
hand, has his ability to challenge patent validity protected by
Lear, but his incentives to challenge are reduced by the prospect of
a free ride on someone else's judgment of invalidity under
Blonder-Tongue. He, too, may want to settle patent disputes,
though his desire may be more to control the timing of a final deci-
sion than to end the dispute completely.
H. APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AFTER Lear
A. Distinguishing Settlement Agreements from Initial Licenses
and Consent Decrees
Since the decision in Lear, lower courts have been attempting
to determine the proper effect of the Lear Court's sweeping en-
couragement of challenges to patent validity. Two areas of general
agreement have emerged.
In the context of license agreements the Lear principle has not
been limited. Under Lear, a licensee remains free to challenge the
validity of a patent, no matter what contrary terms the parties in-
clude in the license agreement.3 5 Nor can he be forced to treat the
.' Id. at 334-42.
Id. at 350.
See text and notes at notes 17-25 supra.
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license as binding pending the disposition of his challenge."6
After some initial confusion over whether Lear would abrogate
the res judicata effect of consent decrees, 7 courts generally have
adhered to the treatment of such decrees that was standard before
Lear."' Thus, although consent decrees reflect the parties' desire to
terminate litigation, they are considered adjudications by the
courts that enter them and are given res judicata effect.40 The
reason commonly adduced is that consent decrees formally are
judgments and cannot be ignored without undermining the dignity
30 Under Lear, the licensee could not be required to continue royalty payments while
his suit was pending, 395 U.S. at 673, although a finding of patent validity would leave him
exposed to damages for infringement. Some courts have required the licensee to continue
royalty payments directly to the patentee. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 567
F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1977); Nebraska Eng'r Corp. v. Shivvers, 557 F.2d 1257, 1259-60 (8th
Cir. 1977). Others have permitted payment into escrow. Precision Shooting Equip., Inc. v.
Allen, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 79 (C.D. 11M. 1980), aft'd, 528 PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYJUGHT J.
(BNA) A-1 (7th Cir. Apr. 7, 1981). Courts also have held that, at least in the absence of
explicit contractual provisions for termination, a licensee challenge does not constitute a
material breach of the license that entitles the patentee to cancel and sue for infringement.
These courts reason that the threat of termination might discourage licensee challenges,
contrary to the policy of Lear. Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp., 366 F. Supp. 733, 737-39 (N.D.
IMI. 1973), a/I'd in relevant part, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974); accord, Skill Corp. v. Lu-
cerne Products, Inc., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 792, 823-24 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Lee v. Lee Custom
Eng'r, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
37 Compare Business Forms Finishing Serv., Inc. v. Carson, 452 F.2d 70, 73-75 (7th Cir.
1971) (refusing enforcement of consent decree of validity primarily on policy basis) with
Maxon Premix Burner Co. v. Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co., 471 F.2d 308, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1972)
(avoiding issues of consent decree's res judicata effect, and holding that defendant had ef-
fectively waived the right to challenge by failing to raise validity claim until after losing on
infringement claim at trial), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973). See also Arnold & Goldstein,
supra note 8, at 1246 (expressing concern that under Lear consent decrees would not be
conclusive).
American Equip. Corp. v. Wikomi Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1980); Wallace
Clark & Co. v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 532 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976
(1976); Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. USM Corp., 525 F.2d 775 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
912 (1976); Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 474 F.2d 1391 (2d Cir. 1973); Schnitger
v. Canoga Elecs. Corp., 462 F.2d 628 (9th Gir. 1972) (per curiam); Swift Chem. Co. v.
Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. La. 1980).
In cases in which a consent decree is not given res judicata effect, the result usually
turns on failure to meet the Addressograph requirement, discussed in text and notes at
notes 42-43 infra. See, e.g., Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'r & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d
530 (5th Cir. 1978) (no recital of infringement); Kraly v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp.,
502 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1974) ($8,000 payment by licensee inadequate basis from which to
infer infringement). But see American Equip. Corp. v. Wikomi Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 544, 547
n.3 (7th Cir. 1980).
39 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932) (a consent decree is "a judicial
act, not a contract").
40 1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.40915], at 1032 (2d ed. 1980).
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and authority of the courts and threatening res judicata
principles.,1
The res judicata effect of patent consent decrees is subject to
one important qualification, first stated thirty-five years ago in Ad-
dressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper.'2 A consent decree of
patent validity will be given res judicata effect only if it contains
"either an adjudication of infringement or a grant of some relief
from which infringement may be inferred.' ' 3 No additional limita-
tions on the effect of consent decrees have arisen in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Lear.44
Res judicata principles are not strictly applicable in the con-
text of settlement agreements, because such agreements are not
necessarily accompanied by a dismissal with prejudice. Yet these
agreements do share some of the characteristics of a consent decree
in that they bring an early end to costly litigation, and they are not
clearly within the realm of ordinary contract law preempted by
Lear. As a result, courts still are faced with a choice between the
traditional encouragement of settlements and a patent exception of
uncertain dimensions. No consistent approach is discernible. The
41 See generally Note, "To Bind or Not to Bind": Bar and Merger Treatment of Con-
sent Decrees in Patent Infringement Litigation, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1322 (1974).
42 156 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1946). See also 1B J. MooRz, supra note 40, 0.405[11], at 786.
43 156 F.2d at 485. The rationale for the Addressograph requirement is that patent
invalidity is a second-line defense for the defendant in an infringement suit. His first effort
will be to show noninfringement; if he can make such a showing, the patent is no real threat
to him, whether it is valid or invalid. Under these circumstances, "the validity of a patent
may be too readily conceded by a party not found to have infringed it." Wallace Clark & Co.
v. Acheson Indus., Inc., 532 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976).
44 That result seems proper, both for the traditional reasons, see text and note at note
41 supra, and because the impact of consent decrees on Lear policies is minimal. Consent
decrees inherently have only the limited res judicata effect of merger and bar, or claim pre-
clusion. See Note, supra note 41, at 1343. Because no issue is "actually litigated," collateral
estoppel or issue preclusion is impossible. (It is mistaken to equate the Addressograph re-
quirement with the "necessary and sufficient holding" requirement of collateral estoppel, as
is done in Comment, Res Judicata Effect of Consent Judgments in Patent Litigation, 18
B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 66 (1976).) The parties to a consent decree therefore can bring
new suits whenever there is a new cause of action, and strangers can make no use whatso-
ever of the judgment.
The Addressograph requirement is simply a means of guaranteeing that the process of
determining which claims are to be merged or barred retains a certain integrity. It provides
only a rough test, however: a recital of infringement does not automatically suggest that the
issue of patent validity was hard-fought, because infringement liability can also be sham.
Whatever doubts there are about the propriety of a particular consent decree, or about the
scope of the cause of action, should be resolved by the judge who enters the consent decree
rather than by the judge who is asked to give it res judicata effect in a later proceeding. See,
e.g., American Equip. Corp. v. Wikomi Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1980) (error to
refuse res judicata effect to a consent decree, based on later court's scrutiny of docket sheet
and affidavits in original proceeding), rev'g 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 17 (S.D. 1l. 1978).
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decided cases tend to stitch together rhetorical commonplaces
rather than to advance legal arguments, and the outcome some-
times depends on a technical ground that either minimizes the di-
lemma or ignores it altogether.
B. Various Approaches to Settlement Issues
1. Applying Lear. Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v.
Golden State Advertising Co.45 was one of the first settlement
cases decided after Lear. At issue was the enforceability of a no-
contest clause in a settlement entered into to avert threatened le-
gal action. The Ninth Circuit treated the clause as "void on its face
and unenforceable, '46 finding that "the recognized policy favoring
settlement of disputes . . . must give way to the policy favoring
free competition in ideas not meriting patent protection. ' 47 The
court saw no point in distinguishing between initial licenses and
settlements, noting that such a distinction would simply invite par-
ties to couch licenses as settlements in order to avoid Lear.48
The court might have pointed to several more specific factors
in order to justify nonenforcement of the particular settlement
agreement. First, it compromised threatened, not actual, litiga-
tion,49 making it impossible for anyone but the parties themselves
to know whether there was in fact any compromise. Second, the
settlement agreement itself was suspicious: the infringer promised
to cease his allegedly infringing activities, forego all challenges to
patent validity, and pay $500 in liquidated damages.' Thus, de-
spite its broad language, the Golden State court may have been
worried about a sham settlement. The possibility that shams could
be dealt with by a method less drastic than the one the court chose
was not discussed in the case.
2. Using Characterization Techniques to Avoid Lear. In
Lear, the Supreme Court left open whether Lear had to pay all
royalties accrued between the negotiation of the license agreement
and the institution of the lawsuit in which Lear's defense was its
claim of patent invalidity. 1 In Aronson, the issue remained un-
45 444 F.2d 425 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971).
46 Id. at 427.
41 Id.; accord, Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Nescher, 404 F. Supp. 680, 683-84 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
48 444 F.2d at 427.
49 Id. at 425.
50 Id.
61 See text and note at note 23 supra.
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resolved, because the respondent had paid all royalties up to the
filing of a declaratory judgment action.2 In the settlement context,
courts have allowed parties to make use of the possible limitation
on Lear to give partial effect to settlement agreements.
Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc.a il-
lustrates this approach. There the patentee and a user of a device
alleged to infringe the patent had entered into a settlement calling
for the infringer to pay $70,000 over five years as "compensation"
for past infringement.4 In a separate document, dated two weeks
later,5" the patentee licensed the infringer to use the patented de-
vice in the future under the patentee's "customary terms and con-
ditions. ' 5 Three years into the term57 the licensee stopped making
all payments, and the patentee sued for enforcement of the $70,000
portion of the agreement. The district court treated the separate
documents as one patent license agreement,58 and held it
unenforceable under Lear and Golden State.59 The Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, treating the part of the agreement sued on as a bind-
ing agreement to pay damages for past infringement, given in con-
sideration for the good-faith compromise of a bona fide claim.60
Thus construed, the transaction lay outside the scope of Lear and
within the policy of favoring "the expedient and orderly settlement
of disputes and the fostering of judicial economy. ' 61
The Seventh Circuit may not have distorted the Ransburg
transaction in order to avoid Lear problems, but the danger of ex-
alting form over substance that inheres in the Ransburg approach
is well illustrated in a Second Circuit decision. In International
Telemeter Corp. v. Teleprompter Corp.,62 the court enforced an
agreement that provided for $245,000, payable in installments, and
a five-year royalty-free license. The court was willing to character-
52 See text and notes at notes 27, 31 supra.
53 489 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1973).
"Id. at 976.
55 Id.
56 Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 1385, 1387
(N.D. IlM. 1972), rev'd, 489 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1973).
57 At that time, in proceedings involving the same device and a different alleged in-
fringer, the Fourth Circuit held that Ransburg's patent had not been infringed. Ransburg
Electro-Coating Corp. v. Ionic Electrostatic Corp., 395 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1018 (1969).
59 340 F. Supp. at 1388.
5, Id. at 1389.
40 489 F.2d at 977.
61 Id. at 978.
62 592 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1979).
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ize the payment as "liquidated damages for past infringement and
not a royalty payment for future use."68
In addition to separating out enforceable components of set-
tlement agreements, the courts apparently have relied on Lear to
guide their interpretation of other settlement contract terms. In
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chemical Corp.," the parties to
an infringement suit had entered into a settlement license contain-
ing a provision that the licensee would not terminate the arrange-
ment for two years. The majority interpreted the provision to bar
the licensee from defaulting on royalty payments, but not from
bringing a declaratory judgment action within the two-year pe-
riod.6 5 Judge Timbers maintained in dissent that the clause was
most naturally interpreted as a two-year ban on all challenges to
patent validity.68 In what was obviously a close case, Lear tipped
the balance for the majority: "[I]f a settlement agreement contains
an explicit prohibition on licensee suits during some future period,
a court may feel that effect should be given to such provisions.
However, the Lear decision militates against reading such provi-
sions into a settlement agreement. 67
3. Defining away Lear. The most enthusiastic support for the
enforceability of patent settlements has come from the Sixth Cir-
cuit. Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co.6 involved a license agreement
entered into to compromise litigation. When the first royalty pay-
ment fell due, the licensee refused to pay; in the patentee's subse-
quent suit for specific performance of the license agreement, the
licensee argued that under Lear he should have the opportunity to
demonstrate patent invalidity and consequently failure of consid-
eration for the settlement agreement. The Sixth Circuit upheld an
order for specific performance.
83 Id. at 57.
- 567 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1977).
65 Id. at 188.
66 Id. at 189 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
67 567 F.2d at 188. But see the same case on remand, 477 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1979):
"[A] specific provision that plaintiffs shall not commence another litigation in less than two
years... may present a question of its enforceability in the light of Lear, Inc. v. Adkins."
Id. at 399 (Weinfeld, J.) (dictum) (footnote omitted).
531 F.2d 1368 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976). Chief Judge Markey of
the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was sitting by designation and wrote the
opinion for the unanimous panel. It is worth noting that the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the Supreme Court have differed over other aspects of patent policy. See, e.g.,
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), revug In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (patent-
ability of algorithm); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), rev'g In re Manson, 333 F.2d
234 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (the utility requirement for process patents).
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The arguments marshalled in support of the result are curious.
For example, the opinion asserts that settlement is "of particular
value in patent litigation," because patent litigation is so time-con-
suming and complex. 9 But Lear had assumed that litigation was a
necessary corrective in the patent system 7 0 and Blonder-Tongue
had proposed to limit the undesirable features of patent suits by
dispensing with repetitious litigation rather than by abbreviating
individual lawsuits.7 1 Lear, Judge Markey argued, did not "con-
done a kind of gamesmanship, wherein an alleged infringer, after
employing the judicial system for months of discovery, negotiation
and sparring, abandons its challenge to validity, executes a license
in settlement, and then repudiates the license and seeks to start
the fight all over again in the courts. 7 2 If the focus is on misuse of
judicial resources, Lear did not condone, or even consider, the
strategy. If the focus is on gamesmanship between the licensee and
the patentee, Lear inevitably allowed it, because it permitted the
licensee to challenge no matter what the license terms were or how
long the licensee had acquiesced in them. Judge Markey's claim
that Lear's anticompetitive concerns were not implicated because
the patent in Aro exerted little, if any, monopoly power"3 makes a
distinction where Lear drew none. Lear's premise was that any in-
valid patent has the potential to earn undeserved monopoly re-
turns, and that a licensing agreement under an invalid patent
makes the potential abuse actual. The Aro court's premise is that
only patents whose commercial value is above a certain unspecified
minimum are worth bothering about.7 4 Finally, the Sixth Circuit
argued that not letting Allied Witan or its privies contest validity
would not seriously inhibit challenges, because other licensees were
available to take up the standard. 5 Again, the distinction is not
one Lear makes: any licensee under Lear can challenge any patent
at any time during the existence of the license.
Having decided the case before it, the Sixth Circuit then pro-
posed a balancing test, to determine when settlements would be
conclusive and when a settling party would be permitted to chal-
'9 531 F.2d at 1372.
70 395 U.S. at 670-71.
71 402 U.S. at 348-50.
72 531 F.2d at 1373.
7S Id. at 1373-74. The royalty payments for the full term of the license, 31/2 years, were
$1,668. Id.
71 See note 73 supra and the court's reference to "monopolophobia," 531 F.2d at 1374.
75 Id. at 1374.
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lenge, notwithstanding the settlement. The courts should rely on
"[e]vidence, not monopolophobia. ' 78 They should require the party
who seeks to avoid the consequences of a settlement agreement to
show that the patent "does in fact have the effect of a 'tax on the
public,' is in fact a cause of increased pricing, is in fact serving to
limit competition in its product line or does in fact exert substan-
tial effect upon the public," and that "the proffered challenge is
the only one likely to be made. '7 7 Again, Judge Markey did not
explain why Lear allows such balancing in the settlement context
but denies it for licenses. The Second Circuit's characterization of
the Aro test as "imprecise and uncertain 7 8 is understated. It is not
clear how a party could show any of the conditions the test re-
quires, or how a court could evaluate the showing. Indeed, putting
this burden on the party who seeks to treat the settlement as un-
enforceable may be tantamount to enforcing patent settlements. If
so, the test is disingenuous.
C. A Rule of Per Se Enforceability
Judge Markey's attempt to narrow the scope of Lear in the
context of patent settlements follows the efforts of many others,7 9
including the Supreme Court itself,80 to confine Lear elsewhere. Al-
though it is difficult to put forward theoretical arguments for the
enforcement of patent settlement agreements that do not apply
with nearly equal force to patent licensing agreements, there are
several practical reasons for establishing a clear rule enforcing pat-
ent settlement agreements, uncomplicated by the balancing that
Judge Markey proposed in Aro.
As has been observed, a patent rewards inventors for their
ideas only to the extent that they can enforce it21 The more fre-
quently they must go to the courts to enforce their patents, the
less valuable the patents are. Furthermore, it is far from clear that
70 Id.
7 Id.
78 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1977). Judge
Timbers, dissenting, thought the test was "a sound accommodation of the competing inter-
ests ... involved." Id. at 190.
70 E.g., Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Spiller & Spiller, Inc., 489 F.2d 974, 977-78
(7th Cir. 1973) (Lear does not reach damages for past infringement); Troxel Mfg. Co. v.
Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1972) (rejecting rule that would allow success-
ful licensee challengers to recover back royalties).
1O Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); see text and notes at notes 26-31 supra.
81 See text and notes at notes 9-16 supra.
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patent litigation effectively distinguishes inventions that are pat-
entable from those that are not.82 Even assuming, however, that
some litigation is desirable, more litigation is not necessarily more
desirable. Forcing patentholders to litigate every dispute fully or
risk litigating again may tax judicial resources without correspond-
ingly reducing the number of invalid patents. If settlements were
not allowed as a means of resolving disputes, the only alternative
to full-dress litigation would be consent decrees.83 But their effect
depends on how the court reviewing the case interprets the Ad-
dressograph requirements." Moreover, the very availability of a
consent decree may turn largely upon the temperament of the
granting judge. On the one hand, a consent decree may be no more
than an exercise in rubber stamping, subjected only to "perfunc-
tory inspection accompanied by a hosanna because another case is
off the calendar."85 On the other hand, one court has stated that in
deference to Lear it has "consistently... refused to sign consent
decrees or judgments in patent cases containing a finding that the
patent involved was valid or that it had been infringed by the
defendant."'
Given the limits imposed on Lear in other contexts, the bur-
dens a no-settlement rule would place on judicial resources, and
the uncertain availability of consent decrees, Lear should not be
s2 There are two distinct problems here. One is how to allocate responsibility between
the Patent Office and the courts. Remarking on the "notorious difference between the stan-
dards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts," the Supreme Court thought that "the
primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent Office. To
await litigation is--for all practical purposes-to debilitate the patent system." Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
The second difficulty is that statistics about patent litigation are unreliable as a basis
for judging its effectiveness. G. KOENIG, PATENT INvALmrrY: A STATISTICAL AND SuBsTANTr
ANALYsis 1-4, 4.31 to -32 & Table 17 (1976), indicates that 60-65% of adjudicated patents
are found invalid, but that this figure represents only about 0.1% of the Patent Office's
output on an average annual basis. Markey, The Status of the U.S. Patent System- Sans
Myth, Sans Fiction, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 164, 167 (1977), points out that the ratio of adju-
dicated patents to patents subject to adjudication is so small as to make conclusions
unreliable.
83 This result is foreshadowed in the District Court's opinion on the remand of Warner-
Jenkinson, where the judge reprimanded both parties for not having originally entered a
consent decree or obtained a judgment with full res judicata effect. "While settlement of
actions is to be encouraged, those which are but a temporary truce in the parties' continued
warfare and present only the facade but not the reality of settlement should not be en-
couraged." 477 F. Supp. 371, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
" See text and notes at notes 38, 44 supra.
s6 Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'r Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1978).
as Butterfield v. Oculus Contact Lens Co., 332 F. Supp. 750, 760 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
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fully extended to patent settlement agreements. This conclusion
corresponds with the decisions of several lower federal courts that
have, in effect, marked off settlement agreements from the broad
sweep of the Lear doctrine, but these courts have not offered rules
that provide sufficient predictability. The decisions of Warner-
Jenkinson and International Telemeter within the same circuit il-
lustrate the problems with the current ad hoc approach. Even
worse, the balancing test Judge Markey proposed in Aro-if it is
taken seriously-injects into every settlement case a whole set of
quasi-antitrust issues. It would be better to treat settlements as
per se enforceable, and achieve a modicum of consistency, leaving
to the Supreme Court or Congress87 the ultimate determination of
how far-reaching the Lear assumptions should be.
One qualification to a rule of per se enforceability is necessi-
tated by the concern expressed in Golden State for the ease with
which Lear can be circumvented by licenses masquerading as set-
tlements. A rule that makes enforceable only settlements entered
into to compromise actual, as opposed to threatened, litigation
would exclude agreements like the one in Golden State.ss Although
a line drawn at the commencement of litigation necessarily is
somewhat arbitrary, it would prevent the most transparent at-
tempts to circumvent Lear, without requiring courts in every case
to evaluate the adequacy of consideration in terms of the credibil-
ity of threats of legal action or guesses about which party might
prevail.
CONCLUSION
Although settlement agreements ordinarily are encouraged as
a means of resolving legal disputes, the effect of attempting to
compromise patent litigation by settlement currently is doubtful.
The Supreme Court has adopted a theory of patent law that em-
phasizes the importance of litigation and the anticompetitive con-
sequences of invalid patents, but it has never explicitly applied
that theory to settlement agreements.
87 There is precedent for congressional action in this area. In 1976 a patent law revision
bill containing an "anti-Lear" provision was passed by the Senate. S. 2255, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 296, 122 CONG. REc. 4507 (1976). It was never enacted, however. For a history of
legislative action, see Scott & Unkovic, Patent Law Reform: A Legislative Perspective of an
Extended Gestation, 16 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 937 (1975), reprinted in 122 CONG. REc. 4520
(1976); Whald', Patent Law Revision-A Dark Look at S. 2255, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 153,
153 (1977).
" See text and notes at notes 45-50 supra.
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As a theoretical matter, if the Supreme Court's premises are
correct, perhaps settlement agreements should be discouraged. Or,
if its premises are wrong, Lear, Inc. v. Adkins and related cases
should be reexamined. The focus of this comment has not been on
theory, however, but on practical concerns. In the absence of a
clear legislative or judicial directive, courts should treat patent
settlement agreements, at least where they are entered into after
litigation has commenced, as they do other settlement agree-
ments-as binding and enforceable contracts.
Ellen Sudranski Friedman
